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Due Diligence · Ethereum, Base, Starknet & 7 others · 12 Oct 2026

sUSN — Noon (Multi-chain)

General2.33Asset2.94Protocol3.22Blockchain2.25
Larger = stronger · 1 best / 5 worst
APB Composite
2.75
Tier 3 — Adequate
Moderate risk; concerns warrant monitoring
F-Gate: Passed · Rated 12 Oct 2026
Strongest: Blockchain (2.25) · Weakest: Protocol (3.22)
How APB ratings work
TL;DR

sUSN is an ERC-4626 savings share over USN, a 24-month-old synthetic dollar whose $40.52M of attested reserves have covered supply on every one of 678 daily attestations (1.0343 on 5 October). The peg record is clean and the yield is organic, but the risk is concentrated: 63.46% of USN liabilities sits in one off-chain Luxembourg private-credit fund marked on a weekly signed report, there is no codified first-loss buffer and the platform operator can write down sUSN principal, the owner Safe can mint uncapped USN with no delay, and a reference-size exit at par is open only to onboarded Verified Users.

Strengths

  • Reserves have never fallen below supply. Accountable's 678 daily attestations since October 2024 all read at or above 1.000, coverage was 1.0343 ($40.52M against $39.17M of USN) on 5 October, and DeFiLlama's USN supply reconciles to the attestation within −1.47%.
  • The peg and operating record are clean: 0 of 596 USN daily closes outside ±50 bps, the worst executed print (−98 bps) recovered in under an hour, and 24 months of operation through four stress windows with no pause and no holder loss.
  • The audit record is current. Noon lists nine audit engagements from 2024 to 2026, and the Ethereum and EVM-remote implementations executed on 1 October match the commit Hashlock reviewed in its September 2026 bridge rate-limiter audit (0 High, 1 Medium acknowledged).
  • Bridge exposure is now rate-limited. Since 1 October each origin chain can mint at most 4M sUSN per 8 hours against the 11.05M sUSN Ethereum lockbox, and since 8 October changing a limit takes a 4-hour timelock on all six EVM chains. TAC and Sophon are deprecated and unlinked, and LayerZero legs require three independent verifiers.

Risks & Constraints

  • One off-chain fund dominates. Fasanara's F-TAC sub-fund holds $24.86M, 61.36% of reserves and 63.46% of USN liabilities, valued on a manager-signed weekly report with T+3-month native redemption and no independent administrator statement; recovery is limited to the $1.34M surplus, a 5.41% break-even haircut.
  • Exit quality depends on who the holder is. Onboarded Verified Users can redeem USN at par through an approval-gated rail capped at 5M USN a day, and every non-dust use so far has come from one operator-linked cluster. A holder limited to the open market clears only $0.93M–$1.19M of the $3.65M reference within 6% over 24 hours.
  • Privileged powers are broad. The 3-of-6 owner Safe can make itself USN admin and mint uncapped USN with no delay, and the ForDefi MPC wallets on Starknet and Sui can upgrade their deployments with no delay and reach the whole 11.05M sUSN lockbox within one 8-hour rate-limit window.
  • Losses are not ring-fenced. No first-loss layer is codified on-chain (the 0.56% insurance fund sits inside reserves), the platform operator may cut sUSN principal pro rata under Staking Terms s.11, and $7.59M of debt is borrowed against sUSN collateral, 27.3 times the depth available to unwind it.
Rated under Clearstar's APB framework after a four-track review across ten chains. Reserve, market and holder data are as of 5 October 2026; governance, bridge and role state is updated to 12 October 2026. Asset 3 (liquidity) is graded for an onboarded Verified User redeeming USN at par through RedeemHandlerV2; a holder limited to the open market faces a materially worse exit. Supersedes the June 2026 rating (2.72, Tier 3).
Full report

Verdict & conditions

Tier 3 — Adequate. The APB composite is 2.75, 0.15 above the Tier 2 ceiling and 0.26 below the Tier 4 floor. The Protocol composite of 3.22 exceeds 3.0, so the Protocol track takes the 1.5× weight penalty. No area grades F in any track, and the F-gate passes.

sUSN is fully reserved, has a clean two-year peg record and pays an organic yield, but almost every material risk traces back to a small number of parties: one off-chain private-credit fund behind most of the backing, one operator-linked wallet cluster behind most of the holder base and exit liquidity, and a small set of Safes and MPC wallets with undelayed powers.

Three rows grade D and carry 1.5× weight within their tracks. Asset 7 (dependencies) is D because 63.46% of USN liabilities sits in one off-chain fund whose failure would cost holders far more than 10%. Protocol 5 (loss absorption) is D because no first-loss capital is codified on-chain and every par redemption to date has gone to linked addresses, so outsiders would absorb a shortfall. Protocol 7 (integrations) is D because $7.59M of debt is borrowed against sUSN, 27.3 times the depth available to unwind it, and 21.9% of that debt sits in markets whose caps can be raised with no delay.

The rating is sensitive to the F-TAC position. A one-letter improvement in the linked Asset 7 and Protocol 6 rows gives 2.67, still Tier 3; a one-letter deterioration takes Asset 7 to F and fails the F-gate.

Conditions to revisit:

sUSN area grades by track on 5 October 2026: three D rows (Asset 7, Protocol 5, Protocol 7), no F in any track
sUSN area grades by track on 5 October 2026: three D rows (Asset 7, Protocol 5, Protocol 7), no F in any track

Rating evolution

Previous rating · 24 Jun 2026
2.72
Tier 3 — Adequate
Ethereum, Base and HyperEVM
→
Current rating · 12 Oct 2026
2.75
Tier 3 — Adequate
Ten chains, under the updated APB method

The headline is almost unchanged, and the small rise does not mean Noon's protocol got worse. Almost all of the upward pressure comes from the Blockchain track, which grades the chains sUSN runs on rather than Noon's own contracts.

TrackJune 2026October 2026APB if only this track had changed
General2.932.332.56 (−0.16)
Asset2.942.942.72 (0.00)
Protocol3.183.222.73 (+0.01)
Blockchain1.252.252.89 (+0.17)
APB2.722.75

Blockchain is the main driver. In June the rating covered Ethereum, Base and HyperEVM, and every chain-level row graded A on Ethereum's strength. sUSN now runs on ten chains, including Starknet, Sui and Berachain. The updated method weights each chain by its share of sUSN float, reserves an A only when every material chain reaches it, and lets a material chain's hard limit bind a row. Under it, six chain-level rows moved from A to B, and decentralisation moved from A to C on Starknet's lack of forced inclusion. The one Blockchain row Noon controls directly, bridge security, was C in June and is C now, with per-chain rate limits live since 1 October. With Blockchain held at its June value, the October rating would be 2.57, Tier 2.

Protocol is essentially flat. The track moved from 3.18 to 3.22 and adds 0.01 to the composite on its own. It still takes the over-3.0 weight penalty, with D rows on loss absorption and reflexive integrations.

General improved on an updated review. Smart Contract Security rose on the September Hashlock audit, the On-Chain Financial Audit was graded for the first time, and Team was graded on the published team page.

Asset is unchanged at 2.94, but its make-up shifted under two other method changes:

The tier scale was also realigned across the site in September 2026: Tier 3 now spans 2.61–3.00, previously 2.26–3.00. Both 2.72 and 2.75 are Tier 3 under either scale.

Overview

PositionHold sUSN, an ERC-4626 share over USN. USN is a synthetic dollar issued by Noon YBS Issuer Ltd (BVI) that expressly "does not represent a claim" on reserves; sUSN is junior to USN and absorbs shortfalls through discretionary pro-rata principal reduction under Staking Terms s.11
MechanismKYB-onboarded institutions mint USN against USDC/USDT (minimum $1M) through MinterHandlerV2. Collateral moves to the operator wallet and into off-chain and on-chain sleeves. Returns are split 80% to sUSN, 10% to the Noon Insurance Fund and 10% to an Operations Fund, and reach sUSN as daily vault rebases that can only add assets
Backing$40.52M of attested reserves against $39.17M of USN (coverage 1.0343, 5 Oct). Fasanara F-TAC private credit 61.36%, Hyperliquid HYPE basis 15.76%, stable cash 6.97%, US T-bills 6.58%, JAAA AAA-CLO ETF 4.42%, Euler and Morpho lending 4.91%. On-chain lines (38.6% of reserves) are verified on a 15-minute cadence; the F-TAC line rests on a weekly signed report
Yield7.36% APY over 30 days (to 30 Sep); monthly 7.15–12.93% over the last year; share price 1.227075 USN per sUSN and never lower. About 80% of gross return is F-TAC mark accrual; NOON points add about 7.9%
ExitVerified Users (34 whitelisted addresses): par redemption of USN through RedeemHandlerV2, approval-gated, 5M USN per day; 8 of them can also unstake sUSN instantly, the rest wait the 7-day cooldown first. Everyone else: the 7-day cooldown into USN, then the open market, which clears about $275k in one trade within 2% and $0.93M–$1.19M over 24 hours within 6%
ChainsTen chains: Ethereum (60.57% of float), Base (21.99%), Starknet (5.66%), Sui (5.38%), Berachain (3.59%), HyperEVM (2.80%), with negligible supply on zkSync Era and Citrea, and on TAC and Sophon, which are deprecated and unlinked. Remote sUSN is backed 1:1 by 11.05M sUSN (39.43% of supply) locked on Ethereum and bridged over Hyperlane and LayerZero, rate-limited at 4M sUSN per 8 hours per origin chain, with limit changes behind a 4-hour timelock

Key metrics

MetricValueDate (UTC)Source
USN reserve coverage1.034332 ($40,517,173 vs $39,172,325; surplus $1,344,847); 678 daily points since 8 Oct 2024, none below 1.0002026-10-05Accountable proof of solvency
F-TAC exposure$24,860,236 = 61.36% of reserves = 63.46% of USN liabilities (63.10% on 30 Sep); signed report dated 28 Sep, 7.4 days old2026-10-05Accountable
Break-even F-TAC haircut5.41% (4.59% excluding the insurance fund); 2.40% on 30 Sep2026-10-05Accountable, derived
Verified share of reserves38.6% at the highest verification level (on-chain, 15-minute cadence); F-TAC and Binance lines at the signed-report level2026-10-05Accountable
DeFiLlama reconciliationUSN circulating $38,597,821 vs attested supply $39,172,325 (−1.47%); protocol TVL $36.95M (peak $39.13M, 28 Aug)2026-10-05DeFiLlama
sUSN supply / share price28,024,429 sUSN (29,318,537 on 30 Sep) / 1.227075 USN per sUSN, never declined2026-10-05On-chain
Paid sUSN APY7.36% over 30 days (206,173 USN of rebases); last 12 months 7.15–12.93% monthly2026-09-30On-chain rebases
Cash-verifiable share of yield24.6% of the paid rate (Hyperliquid funding, T-bills, JAAA, DeFi lending); F-TAC mark accrual 80.3% of gross return2026-09-30Derived
Exit reference$3,645,683 (10% of TVL on 30 Sep); $3,438,808 at 5 Oct2026-10-05Derived
Open-market exitSingle trade on Ethereum: 1.60% at $275k, 8.40% at $300k, 92.46% at the reference. Paced 24h within 6%: $931,522–$1,188,781 (25.6–32.6% of the reference); 7 days 85.7%2026-10-05KyberSwap, CoW, LI.FI quotes
Verified User par rail5M USN/day and 1M/block caps; 15 requests all-time, 13 approved in 0.04–0.98 h, 0 rejected, 2 dust expired; largest 24h payout 1,906,844 USN2026-10-05On-chain (RedeemHandlerV2)
Issuer idle bufferStable cash $2,825,367 + T-bills $2,664,772 = 151% of the reference; redemption treasury float $140,4832026-10-05Accountable, on-chain
Largest holdersLargest wallet 34.17% of supply; the three vault-programme borrower wallets 82.34% (gross)2026-10-05Noon registry, on-chain
sUSN market price vs NAV−0.60% (pool 1.21973 vs NAV 1.22708), below −50 bps since 28 Sep2026-10-05On-chain
USN peg0 of 596 daily closes outside ±50 bps; worst executed print 0.99015 (−98 bps, 24 Jul 2026), recovered within 0.99 h2024-10 to 2026-10On-chain swaps
Bridge lockbox11,050,706 sUSN locked on Ethereum (39.43% of supply) vs 11,050,692 remote; per-origin limit 4M sUSN per 8h2026-10-05On-chain
Debt against sUSN collateral$7,593,158 across 8 lending markets = 27.3x unwind depth; no liquidations on Morpho or Vesu to date2026-09-30On-chain
Hyperliquid basisShort 60,437 HYPE ($5.60M notional, 10x cross), hedge ratio 1.0001, liquidation price +87.2%2026-10-05Hyperliquid API
Nexus Mutual cover$2,765,832 across 3 policies ($3,265,833 on 30 Sep); terms not reviewed2026-10-05Accountable
Operating historyUSN live 24.0 months, vault 22.9 months; 0 pause events; vault upgraded 17 times, USN 5 times2026-10-05On-chain
USN reserve coverage from October 2024 to October 2026 — every daily attestation reads at or above 1.000; the surplus has widened since mid-2026, reaching 1.0343 on 5 October
USN reserve coverage from October 2024 to October 2026 — every daily attestation reads at or above 1.000; the surplus has widened since mid-2026, reaching 1.0343 on 5 October

Economic model & what you are holding

USN is minted only by KYB-onboarded institutions, against USDC or USDT with a $1M minimum. The collateral passes through Noon's operator wallet into a mixed book. The largest sleeve by far is Fasanara Tactical Private Credit (F-TAC), a sub-fund of a Luxembourg ELTIF umbrella with an external AIFM (Ascender Fund Partners) and auditor (KPMG). The rest is a delta-neutral HYPE funding-rate position on Hyperliquid, US T-bills and the JAAA AAA-CLO ETF held through Alpaca, Euler and Morpho lending, and stable cash. Returns are split 80% to sUSN, 10% to the Noon Insurance Fund and 10% to an Operations Fund, and reach sUSN as daily rebases that can only add assets.

TokenRole / seniorityYield basisMintRedemptionCharacter
USNStable liability of Noon YBS Issuer Ltd (BVI); "does not represent a claim"None directly (NOON points)Permissioned, against USDC/USDT, $1M minimumPar through RedeemHandlerV2 for 34 whitelisted Verified Users, approval-gated, 5M USN/day; secondary holders "may not redeem"Unsecured synthetic dollar backed by an off-chain credit and basis book
sUSNERC-4626 share over USN; junior, absorbs shortfalls via s.11 principal reduction80% of returns via add-only rebases; share price 1.227075Permissionless USN deposit7-day cooldown into USN (permissionless), or instant for 8 vault-whitelisted addressesYield-bearing exposure to private credit and basis
NOONGovernance and points token, 1B fixed supplyPoints from a 65% community allocation——Incentive layer, about 7.9% of sUSN yield

Loss waterfall. No first-loss layer is codified on-chain. The Noon Insurance Fund ($204k, 0.56% of supply) is an uncodified Safe counted inside reserves. After it comes the economic surplus ($1.34M), and after that losses fall on sUSN holders through the platform operator's "absolute right" to reduce sUSN principal pro rata on a Suspension Event. No trustee for token holders is identified, and holders have no claim on reserves. Nexus Mutual cover of $2.77M exists, but its terms were not reviewed.

What the holder is getting into:

sUSN yield by source on 30 September 2026 — cash-verifiable legs cover $0.62M of the $2.51M a year paid to holders; the rest of gross return is F-TAC mark accrual
sUSN yield by source on 30 September 2026 — cash-verifiable legs cover $0.62M of the $2.51M a year paid to holders; the rest of gross return is F-TAC mark accrual

Top risks, ranked

#RiskMechanismSeverity
1Exit quality hinges on holder type and one clusterOpen market: 25.6–32.6% of the reference per paced 24 hours within 6%. Verified Users: a discretionary par rail funded by manual top-ups and used so far only by cluster-linked requestersCritical
2F-TAC credit concentration63.46% of liabilities in one off-chain fund on a signed weekly report; recovery limited to a 5.41% surplusHigh
3Uncapped USN mint by the owner SafesetAdmin + mint with no cap and no delay; only the 3-of-6 threshold stands in the wayHigh
4Undelayed spoke authority reaching the lockboxThe Starknet ForDefi MPC wallet, or the two Hyperlane validator operators on the default route, can release up to 12M sUSN per 8-hour window, 100% of the lockbox; the Sui MPC wallet 4MHigh
5First-loss inversion0% codified buffer; the par rail has no coverage link and linked addresses exit first; residual loss falls on queued holders via s.11High
6Reflexive leverage on thin depth$7.59M of sUSN-collateral debt across 8 markets = 27.3x unwind depth; Euler and Vesu caps can be raised instantlyHigh
7Holder concentration and forced sellersLargest wallet 34.17%, borrower set 82.34% and rising; those wallets owe vault depositors and hold thin liquid assetsHigh
8Weak holder recourse, offshore issuerUSN is not a claim on reserves; redemption is unsecured and open only to onboarded users; the platform operator may cut sUSN principalHigh
9Off-chain single point of failureF-TAC 61.36% of reserves with no committed fallback; transparency is detective onlyHigh
10Yield rests on unrealised marks80.3% of gross return is F-TAC accrual; 24.6% is cash-verifiableMedium

Ranks 11–19 are in the appendix.

General DD

General composite: 2.33. General DD covers six areas and draws on the VALIS review dated 23 September 2026, updated on 5 October for the September Hashlock audit, the reserve reconciliation and Noon's published team page, and on 12 October for Noon's governance changes. VALIS also graded a seventh "Bridge Security" row F on automated findings; that row is outside the six General areas, and bridges are assessed under Blockchain 7.

#AreaGradeObservationWhy not adjacent
1Governance and access controlCVerified 3-of-6 Safe, 48h upgrade timelock and a 4h timelock on bridge limits, LayerZero configuration and redemption and minter settings, but a codeless key holds a live MINTER role and vault and USN emergency operations have no timelockNot B: material undelayed powers remain. Not D: core upgrades sit behind a multisig and timelock
2Smart contract securityBNine audits, four dated 2026, latest Hashlock September 2026; the live Ethereum and EVM-remote implementations equal the reviewed commitNot A: MinterHandlerV2 runs a pre-remediation build, the zkSync OFT builds are outside documented scope, and the bug bounty is email-only. Not C: every fund-holding Ethereum proxy is covered by the latest audit
3Oracle securityCLive Stork and Chainlink stack, but single-source critical feeds, no fallback, nanosecond timestamps that disable consumer staleness checks, and a hardcoded USN fixed-rate oracleNot B: no redundancy. Not D: feeds are live and coherent
4On-chain financial auditCDeFiLlama reconciles USN supply within −1.47%; Accountable splits reserves into 21 lines and verifies 38.6% on-chainNot B: the 61.36% F-TAC sleeve is attested only by a signed report. Not D: supply, reserves and flows reconcile
5Team reputation and transparencyAnoon.capital/about lists nine team members with roles and eight LinkedIn profilesThe page gives first names only, names no directors or legal entity, and the profiles were not independently verified; see Operational risk
6Economic designBRevenue-share ERC-4626 yield with no emissions and no reflexive loopNot A: off-chain-only attestation of the main sleeve and a Fasanara deploy/custody conflict

At C on Team, the General composite would be 2.67 and the APB 2.84, still Tier 3.

Asset DD

Asset composite: 2.94. The backing is fully reserved and the peg is tight, but the exit, the holder base and the backing each concentrate in a few parties. Asset 7 is the only D; a second D in this track would take the composite above 3.0 and add an Asset track penalty.

#AreaGradeObservationWhy not adjacent
1Asset mechanism & designCCoverage at or above 1.000 on every daily point (1.0343 on 5 Oct); F-TAC 61.36% of reserves on a signed reportNot B: a single 61% off-chain fund is not "minimal, exceptionally safe". Not D: documented assets exceed 100% and past dips were recognition timing, not write-downs
2Ownership & supply distributionCLargest wallet 34.17%, vault-programme borrower set 82.34% (gross, up from 79.18%); largest holder 9.93% when borrower sUSN is attributed to the vaults' USDC depositorsNot B: concentration is far above B's top-ten bound. Not D: graded on the depositor look-through; on gross wallet balances the row would be D
3Liquidity & market depthCVerified User par rail: 5M USN/day cap, 13 of 13 non-dust approvals in 0.04–0.98 h, 4.54M USN in 5 days. Open market: 25.6–32.6% of the reference per 24h within 6%Not B: the rail is gated, discretionary and funded by top-ups. Not D: no rejection, expiry or block over 24 hours on record. Applies only to Verified Users
4Volatility & price behaviourAUSN 0 of 596 daily closes outside 50 bps; worst executed print −98 bps, recovered within an hour; sUSN −0.60% vs NAV for 6.6 daysNot B: no daily close or stress window breached 50 bps. The open sUSN discount is the main reason to watch this row
5Smart contract implementationCAll in-scope code verified; bridge minting bounded at 4M per 8h per origin; mintAndRebase capped at 25k USN per call; USN setAdmin + mint uncapped with no delayNot B: an unbounded mint hook remains and MinterHandlerV2 drifts from its audit. Not D: every other critical hook is bounded on-chain
6Incentives & sustainabilityCIncentives about 7.9% of yield; 80.3% of gross return is F-TAC mark accrual; cash-verifiable legs cover 24.6% of the paid rateNot B: three-quarters of the payout lacks evidenced cash. Not D: the accrual is private credit, not a market-inverting leg, and the rate has never fallen
7Dependencies & external risksDF-TAC $24.86M = 63.46% of liabilities (up from 63.10%); recovery limited to the 5.41% surplusNot C: more than 50% to one off-chain counterparty with loss-given-failure above 10%. Not F: F-TAC is identified and regulated and has not failed
8Regulatory & issuer riskCUnlicensed BVI issuer; separate platform operator; USN "does not represent a claim"; operator has s.11 write-down rightNot B: an offshore unlicensed issuer is capped at C. Not D: reserves are segregated and attested live, and both entities are named first-party

Asset 3 (C, Verified Users only). The rated holder is an onboarded Verified User whitelisted on RedeemHandlerV2 for USN-to-USDC par redemption, with the issuer's idle buffer behind the rail. On that basis the C condition — "KYC/whitelist-gated redemption that is reliable (reference-size exits within days)" — is met on the record: the daily cap is 137% of the reference, all 13 non-dust requests were approved in under an hour with none rejected, and 4.54M USN was paid out in five days. The weaknesses are real. Approval is discretionary. The treasury float is only $140k, so payouts rely on issuer top-ups, and the $5.49M idle buffer is not contractually committed. Holders who are not also vault-whitelisted (26 of 34) first wait the 7-day cooldown. No arms-length Verified User has yet used the rail: every non-dust request came from the operator-linked cluster, and the 24 non-cluster whitelisted addresses hold 2.1% of the reference. A holder limited to the open market faces a different asset. A single trade on Ethereum moves 1.60% at $275k and 92.46% at the reference; paced over 24 hours, only $0.93M–$1.19M clears within 6%, and the best 7-day result is 85.7%. On that route liquidity meets the F condition. The row moves to D on any non-dust rejection or expiry, an approval lead over 24 hours, the rail paused for more than 24 hours, a daily cap below the reference, an unfunded treasury with a request pending over 24 hours, a non-cluster whitelist removal, or stable cash plus T-bills falling below the reference.

sUSN exit cost by holder type on 5 October 2026 — the open-market single-trade curve passes 6% just above $275k and reaches 92% at the $3.65M reference, while Verified Users redeem at par up to the 5M USN daily cap
sUSN exit cost by holder type on 5 October 2026 — the open-market single-trade curve passes 6% just above $275k and reaches 92% at the $3.65M reference, while Verified Users redeem at par up to the 5M USN daily cap

Asset 7 (D). F-TAC is a sub-fund of Fasanara Investments IV SA SICAV ELTIF (LEI 213800Q5VPA7XPK9HU52), with an external AIFM and KPMG as umbrella auditor; its administrator and depositary are not disclosed. At $24.86M it is 61.36% of reserves and 63.46% of USN liabilities. The share of liabilities has increased since 30 September (from 63.10%) because USN supply fell while the F-TAC line stayed flat. The position is valued on a manager-signed weekly report, the latest dated 28 September, and redeems natively on T+3 months. Recovery in a loss is limited to the $1.34M surplus, a 5.41% break-even haircut (2.40% on 30 September). Concentration above 50% in one off-chain counterparty with loss-given-failure well above 10% is D on the sizing rule. The row is not F because F-TAC is identified and regulated and has not failed. It moves to F on a realised F-TAC loss.

USN reserves by custodian on 5 October 2026 — Fasanara's F-TAC fund is 61.36% of attested reserves, above the 50% single-counterparty line
USN reserves by custodian on 5 October 2026 — Fasanara's F-TAC fund is 61.36% of attested reserves, above the 50% single-counterparty line

Asset 2 (C). Read on gross wallet balances, one wallet holds 34.17% of sUSN and the three borrower wallets of Noon's own vault programme hold 82.34%, both above the D thresholds (30% single, 70% top ten). Those wallets borrow USDC from Accountable vaults whose depositors hold the credit claim; attributing borrower sUSN to those depositors gives a largest holder of 9.93% and a top pair of 19.07%, which sets the C. Concentration is rising: the largest wallet held no sUSN before July 2026.

Asset 5 (C). Every critical hook except one is bounded on-chain: bridge minting at 4M sUSN per 8 hours per origin, mintAndRebase at 25,000 USN per call, and MinterHandlerV2's mint at 10M per block and per day (limits that take 4 hours to change since 12 October). The exception is USN itself: the owner Safe can call setAdmin on itself and then mint any amount, with no delay. Neither the 48-hour upgrade timelock nor the 4-hour settings timelock covers that path. C is also the post-audit ceiling, because MinterHandlerV2 runs the build Sherlock reviewed before remediation and the zkSync OFT builds sit outside documented audit scope. The row moves to D on any use of the uncapped path or any new unbounded hook.

Asset 8 (C). The issuer, Noon YBS Issuer Ltd, is a BVI company with no disclosed licence. The sUSN Staking Terms, s.2 identify Noon HoldCo Ltd as the platform operator, a separate legal entity from the issuer. Noon has confirmed directly that Noon HoldCo Ltd is the holding company for all Noon activities and is an orphaned entity whose shares are held by a BVI Purpose Trust. The holding company, issuer and shareholder trust have distinct roles. Holders have no claim on backing, and s.11 gives the platform operator the right to reduce staked principal proportionally to losses during a Suspension Event. Governing law is BVI, with arbitration, a class-action waiver and a 12-month claims bar.

Protocol DD

Protocol composite: 3.22, above 3.0, so the track takes the 1.5× weight penalty. The mechanism has worked for 24 months and has never lost holder funds, but losses are unallocated and two rows stand at D: loss absorption (Protocol 5) and reflexive integrations (Protocol 7).

#AreaGradeObservationWhy not adjacent
1Protocol design & mechanicsCOriginal ERC-4626 vault (~23 months); two-tier exit (instant for whitelisted addresses, 7-day escrow for everyone else); no on-chain loss recognitionNot B: no coverage-linked gate or pro-rata exit in a shortfall. Not D: exits are ordered by access but not trapped
2Proven model & lineageCOriginal code diff-matched to audited commits; arms-length exits about 22.8M USN; 85.9% of par redemptions to operator-linked addressesNot B: capital processed is small and mostly insider-circulated. Not D: lineage is clear and the model has run 23 months
3Fee structure & economic modelCNo on-chain fee variable or setter; rebases can only add assets; the take share is chosen off-chain with no on-chain maximum or timelockNot B: no dated revenue against disclosed running costs. Not D: no setting can reach held balances, and every redemption path keeps a minimum-out
4Operational history & stress performanceB24.0 months live; USN never closed below 0.995 across four stress windows; 0 pauses; the April 2026 LayerZero incident resolved with no holder lossNot A: no multi-downturn record at growing organic TVL. Not C: TVL is within 6% of its peak and every upgrade since March 2026 went through the 48h timelock
5Liquidation & risk managementDCodified first-loss layer 0.000%; insurance fund 0.561% (uncodified); 17 of 17 par payouts to linked addresses; redemption-rail setters unbounded, behind a 4h timelockNot C: only codified capital counts toward the ~1% buffer test. Not F: no bad debt and no failed payout
6Dependency chainCF-TAC 61.36% of reserves with no committed fallback; the capital flow is fully traced; coverage at or above 1.000 on all 678 daysNot B: the F-TAC dependency is off-chain and unmitigated. Not D: every layer is identified and traced and the attestor is live; a stricter single-point-of-failure reading gives D
7Integration & composability riskD$7,593,158 of sUSN-collateral debt across 8 markets = 27.3x depth; 66.1% of one Vesu market is one borrower; instant Euler and Vesu caps; 0 liquidationsNot C: debt far exceeds the 3x bound and 21.9% has no delay-protected ceiling. Not F: no exploit, drain or bad debt
8Governance attack surfaceCCore EVM structure: 3-of-N Safes with 48h timelocks on proxy upgrades, now including zkSync. Starknet and Sui upgrade authority: ForDefi MPC wallets with no delay, over 3.09M sUSNNot B: undelayed runtime powers and undelayed spoke upgrades. Not D: the core EVM structure is multisig-plus-timelock and the spoke keys are held in ForDefi MPC

Protocol 5 (D). Loss absorption is measured as a stock of codified capital, and that stock is 0.000%. The insurance fund (0.561% of supply) is an uncodified Safe inside reserves, the reserve surplus is economic rather than committed, and the redemption treasury float sits outside the attestation. The par rail has no link to coverage: in a shortfall, Verified Users could keep redeeming at par while queued sUSN holders absorb the loss through s.11. Every one of the 17 treasury payouts to date went to linked whitelisted addresses, and another 4.54M USN went out at par to cluster requesters between 30 September and 5 October. The rail's limit, feed and treasury setters have no bound; since 12 October they sit behind a 4-hour timelock rather than with the owner Safe directly. The row is not F because there is no bad debt and no demonstrated failure.

What stands in front of sUSN holders in a loss, 30 September 2026 — no codified first-loss layer; the insurance fund, reserve surplus and redemption float are each below the ~1% codified-buffer test
What stands in front of sUSN holders in a loss, 30 September 2026 — no codified first-loss layer; the insurance fund, reserve surplus and redemption float are each below the ~1% codified-buffer test

Protocol 7 (D). On 30 September, $7.59M was borrowed against sUSN across eight markets on Morpho (Ethereum, Base, Berachain), Euler (Base, HyperEVM), Vesu (Starknet) and Market01 (Sui), against roughly $278k of open-market depth to unwind it. 21.9% of that debt, in the Euler and Vesu markets, sits under caps that can be raised with no delay. The oracle family is single-source, with no upgrade delay on any feed. There have been no liquidations on Morpho or Vesu and no bad debt, so the row is not F.

Debt against sUSN collateral by market on 30 September 2026 — $7.59M in total, with the Euler and Vesu markets under caps that can be raised without delay
Debt against sUSN collateral by market on 30 September 2026 — $7.59M in total, with the Euler and Vesu markets under caps that can be raised without delay

Protocol 6 and Protocol 3 (C). Both sit at the C/D boundary. F-TAC is a critical dependency with no committed fallback, and the liquid buffer covers only about 29% of it; the row is held at C because the whole capital flow is traced and the attestor is live and independent. On fees, there is no on-chain fee setter and rebases can only add assets, but the take share is set off-chain with no on-chain maximum; the row is held at C because no setting can reach held balances.

Protocol 8 (C). Upgrade authority over the Starknet and Sui deployments sits with ForDefi MPC wallets but has no delay. The core Ethereum and EVM structure — 3-of-N Safes, 48-hour timelocks on proxy upgrades (on zkSync since 8 October), a 4-hour timelock on bridge limits, LayerZero configuration and redemption and minter settings, and some runtime powers without a timelock — fits C. The TAC and Sophon deployments, still upgradeable by the deployer key, are deprecated and unlinked at every end. The row moves to D if the spoke authorities gain reach or any core upgrade path loses its timelock, and toward B if Starknet and Sui upgrades gain a delay.

Blockchain DD

Blockchain composite: 2.25. Ethereum holds 60.57% of float and anchors most rows at B. The two C rows are Starknet's lack of forced inclusion (Blockchain 1) and the bridge (Blockchain 7).

#AreaGradeObservationWhy not adjacent
1Decentralisation & validator setCFloat-weighted anchor 1.664 (B); Starknet (5.663% of float, material) is Stage 1 but users cannot force inclusionNot B: a permissioned, deadline-free bypass is a limited escape hatch at best. Not D: the Security Council minority bypass is read as a limited hatch; without it the Starknet cap would bind the row at D
2Consensus & security modelBAnchor 1.461; Starknet has a whitelisted proposer; Berachain hard fork (Nov 2025) on a minority chainNot A: five material chains are below A. Not C: no consensus failure on any material chain
3Client diversityBAnchor 1.648; Ethereum Geth 50.13%, Lighthouse 52.53%; Sui runs a single client (halt Nov 2024)Not A: material chains below A. Not C: the majority-float chain meets A
4Uptime & reliabilityBAnchor 2.068; no Ethereum halt; Base, Starknet, Sui and Berachain have had multi-hour haltsNot A: minority-chain halts. Not C: only an Ethereum degradation would move the row
5Maturity & ecosystemBAnchor 1.573; Ethereum $53.24B and 1,859 protocols; Berachain −98.8% from peakNot A: reserved while material chains are below A. Not C: no limb fails on the majority chain
6Validator behaviourBAnchor 1.808; OFAC-filtering relays 12.82% on Ethereum (minority); validator interventions on Sui and Berachain targeted exploit proceedsNot A: minority-chain interventions. Not C: no collusion or attack by validators
7Bridge security & cross-chainCLockbox 39.43% of supply; 4M/8h per-origin limits live; the Starknet MPC wallet or two Hyperlane validator operators can reach 100% of the lockbox per windowNot B: the weakest path reaches the whole lockbox in one window. Not D: limits are live and timelocked, TAC and Sophon are unlinked and LayerZero legs need 3 verifiers; graded on the weakest path alone the row would be D
8Regulatory & jurisdictionalBAnchor 1.757; Base and Starknet have single-jurisdiction operators; Berachain and HyperEVM restrict US personsNot A: material single-jurisdiction operators. Not C: no limb fails on Ethereum

Blockchain 7 (C). Remote sUSN is minted on each spoke only by bridge messages from registered remotes, and is backed 1:1 by 11.05M sUSN (39.43% of supply) held in the Ethereum vault. Since 1 October each enrolled origin can release at most 4M sUSN per 8-hour window, and since 6–8 October the limits on Ethereum, Base, Berachain, HyperEVM, Citrea and zkSync sit behind a 4-hour timelock owned by each chain's Safe, which can no longer change them directly. TAC and Sophon are deprecated: on Ethereum, Base and HyperEVM their routes point to the dead address with 1 wei limits, LayerZero peers to Sophon are cleared, both were unenrolled from Starknet on 2 October, and Berachain and Citrea were never connected. LayerZero legs require three verifiers (LayerZero Labs, Nansen and Horizen on Sui), and on Ethereum USN and sUSN and on zkSync the LayerZero delegate is the 4-hour timelock, so DVN, library and skip changes take 4 hours; Hyperlane configuration remains instant. The two uninitialised Flare deployments have no peers. No upgrade is pending on any chain's timelock. The weakness is the weakest path. The Starknet sUSN owner, a ForDefi MPC wallet, can upgrade the token with no delay and, through the hub, HyperEVM and zkSync lanes, reach 12M sUSN per window — more than the whole lockbox. The two Hyperlane validator operators on the default route reach the same amount, and the Sui MPC wallet reaches 4M (36.2%).

sUSN on other chains against the Ethereum lockbox on 5 October 2026 — 11.05M sUSN locked on Ethereum backs remote supply led by Base (6.16M); each origin chain is limited to 4M sUSN per 8 hours
sUSN on other chains against the Ethereum lockbox on 5 October 2026 — 11.05M sUSN locked on Ethereum backs remote supply led by Base (6.16M); each origin chain is limited to 4M sUSN per 8 hours

Strategy & counterparty exposure

USN reserves by sleeve, Accountable, 5 October 2026:

Leg$% of reservesCustodian / venueVerification
Fasanara F-TAC private credit24,860,23661.36%Fasanara (Luxembourg ELTIF)Signed weekly report (28 Sep)
Hyperliquid HYPE basis (lending + margin)6,384,13115.76%ForDefi / operator walletOn-chain
Stable cash (incl. $1.47M USDC at ForDefi and the $0.20M insurance fund)2,825,3676.97%ForDefi / Safe / Noon walletsOn-chain
US T-bills (Dinari USD+)2,664,7726.58%Alpaca / operator walletOn-chain (zkTLS-bound)
JAAA AAA-CLO ETF1,792,3644.42%AlpacaOn-chain
Euler lending1,010,6242.49%ForDefiOn-chain
Morpho lending979,6792.42%ForDefiOn-chain

The seven lines sum exactly to the $40,517,173 attested. The redemption treasury float ($140,483) sits outside the attestation.

CounterpartyExposureReturnRecordRecoverability
Fasanara F-TAC (AIFM Ascender Fund Partners; auditor KPMG)$24.86MAbout 10.1% implied on the mark (15% target)No F-TAC cash receipt observed at a Noon wallet since 2025; accrual recognised weeklyT+3 months native; administrator and depositary undisclosed
Hyperliquid (basis venue, HyperCore lending)$6.38MFunding about 8% of gross returnPosition grew about 24% since 30 SepHedge ratio 1.0001; liquidation price +87.2%; spot HYPE now supplied to HyperCore lending under portfolio margin
Alpaca / Dinari (T-bills)$2.66M (−$1.30M since 30 Sep)About 4%Balance bound to the operator walletDaily liquid
Alpaca (JAAA)$1.79MAbout 5.5%—ETF daily liquidity
Morpho / Euler$1.99MAbout 6%—On-chain, subject to pool liquidity
ForDefi (custody of the operator wallet)27.14% of reserves——MPC custody claimed first-party only; address-poisoning campaign live
Nexus Mutual (cover)$2.77M (3 policies)——Cover terms not reviewed

The net read:

Holder concentration. Canonical supply on 5 October was 28,024,429 sUSN.

#HolderToken / venue% supplyClassification
10x272BB989F1a272758cB8070f94Cb6540E9C20005sUSN wallet; Symphony vault loan borrower (Arbitrum)34.17Operator-linked
20x7e03eA3852489D3A3326ac51c1f81dFd8b1d3705sUSN wallet + Morpho/Euler loops; Monad vault loan borrower27.87Operator-linked
30xf0d3B3C52512a7a229Bc27065Fb99CE564eD5e30sUSN + Base/HyperEVM/Berachain loops; Citrea vault loan borrower17.06Operator-linked
40x5476F4E23dAA093Ce6700e1026013c55F7AF9083Makina Caliber via Royco senior tranche (Base)4.48Third party
50x95780F943b6361FB11eEd893cf1237Dd9B3F54AFPendle, Royco junior; sole LP of the USN/USDT and sUSN/USN pools~3.6Operator-linked
60x4ac4f6c2262f829c82d01be3f0f0db0e2a72fa2a16d38fc9e34e3f36b166d8dVesu Clearstar Reactor depositor (Starknet)2.48Third party
70xC1F39C3A1BD08a792a8B650fFc2cf03343B11CB4sUSN (Ethereum)1.98Third party
80x6d9013c2f8691040307a9e5bae6750f5808f3b7f297d80f7f196f7054c7ad67bSui sUSN (coin + Market01 loop)1.93Operator-linked
90xE6bAA323545Bd92A5Db289F5368a5eDeEC059B52sUSN (Ethereum)1.44Operator-linked
100x187040e4b230e352758a4e7d76c9b42e1ec5191a5227007f688cd67400534563Sui sUSN market-maker wallet1.24Operator-linked

The dominant cluster is linked on-chain to the operator: it gas-funds the deployer, minter and redemption-treasury keys, and its three largest wallets are the named borrowers of Noon's own vault programme. That they belong to the same legal entity as Noon is not established; no cluster address is a signer on a Noon Safe.

Noon's first-party registry lists six Accountable vaults whose loans are all managed by one codeless investment manager (0xd85E704a1f234cF319D9708B9130AEDC1c40c017). Vault depositors hold a USDC credit claim on the borrower, not sUSN, and vault liquidity is thin: the Symphony vault holds 258,391 USDC against 11.77M shares, and the Monad vault 13,880 USDC against 7.21M. The cluster has also been the main source of USN collateral: the original collateral Safe passed through $118.06M, fed by the top three wallets ($25.19M, $11.04M and $6.75M of USDC), and is now empty. A registry jump of 886k sUSN for the second-largest wallet, with unchanged supply, was not yet confirmed on-chain at the read.

Top 10 sUSN holders on 5 October 2026 — the three largest wallets, all Noon vault-programme borrowers in the operator-linked cluster, hold 79% of supply between them
Top 10 sUSN holders on 5 October 2026 — the three largest wallets, all Noon vault-programme borrowers in the operator-linked cluster, hold 79% of supply between them

Operational risk

Governance & privileged roles

Upgrade and admin authority differs sharply by chain. The core Ethereum deployment sits behind a 3-of-6 Safe and a 48-hour upgrade timelock, and bridge limits, LayerZero configuration and redemption and minter settings take 4 hours to change. Several runtime powers on that Safe still have no delay, and the spokes range from multisig-plus-timelock to MPC wallets with no delay.

ChainFloat shareUpgrade authorityDelayNotable undelayed powers
Ethereum (hub)60.57%ProxyAdmins → Upgrade Timelock → Safe 3-of-648 h on upgrades; 4 h on bridge limits, LayerZero configuration and redemption and minter settingsUSN setAdmin + uncapped mint; pause of vault and USN; setWithdrawalHandler (no event); USN blacklist over the withdrawal escrow; Hyperlane configuration
Base21.99%ProxyAdmin → Timelock → Safe 3-of-548 h; 4 h on rate limitsMailbox, ISM and remote-token configuration by the Safe; admin and blacklist roles held by the Safe only
Starknet5.66%ForDefi MPC wallet (Braavos account)noneInstant upgrade(ClassHash); reach of 12M sUSN per window through the hub lanes
Sui5.38%ForDefi MPC wallet (UpgradeCaps and OApp AdminCap)nonePackage upgrades; reach of 4M sUSN per window
Berachain3.59%ProxyAdmin → Timelock → Safe 3-of-548 h; 4 h on rate limitsAdmin and blacklist roles held by the Safe only since the deployer renounced them on 30 Sep
HyperEVM2.80%ProxyAdmin → Timelock → Safe 3-of-524 h; 4 h on rate limitsAdmin and blacklist roles held by the Safe only
Citrea~0%ProxyAdmin → Timelock → Safe 3-of-548 h; 4 h on rate limitsAdmin and blacklist roles held by the Safe only; all five Safe signers are codeless addresses, custody unverified
zkSync Era~0%ProxyAdmins → Timelock → Safe 3-of-448 h (since 8 Oct); 4 h on rate limits and LayerZero configurationBoth proxies were re-implemented outside the Ethereum timelock queue before the timelock was added
TAC, Sophon~0%ProxyAdmins → deployer keynoneDeprecated and unlinked at every end: dead-address routes at 1 wei on Ethereum, Base and HyperEVM, Sophon peers cleared, unenrolled from Starknet
PowerHolderDelayBound / use
Pause vault and USNOwner Safe 3-of-60 sPausing the vault freezes all transfers, including cooldown entry. Never used
Exit re-point (setWithdrawalHandler)Owner Safe0 sEmits no event and has no getter. Never used
Escrow freeze (USN blacklist of the withdrawal escrow)Owner Safe0 sFreeze only, no seizure. Never used
Cooldown length (setWithdrawPeriod)Generic Timelock48 hUnbounded and retroactive. Set to zero three times in 2025 and restored the same day
MintOwner Safe; codeless minter key0 sUSN setAdmin + mint uncapped; mintAndRebase 25k USN per call (209 calls, 1.39M USN to date), a cap that takes 4 h to change
Redemption-rail and minter settings (redemption limits, treasury, price feeds, pause, whitelist, mint limits, rebase limit, custody wallet)4h Timelock; the owner Safe renounced direct admin on 12 Oct4 hCovers RedeemHandlerV2 and MinterHandlerV2. A cut in the oracle staleness window from 48 h to 25 h is queued
Bridge rate limits4h Timelock owned by each chain's Safe4 h0 means unlimited, 1 wei is an effective halt. Set on 1 October; behind the timelock on Ethereum, Base, Berachain, HyperEVM, Citrea and zkSync since 6–8 October
LayerZero configuration (DVNs, libraries, skips)4h Timelock as delegate on Ethereum USN and sUSN and on zkSync4 hDelegate since 8 October
Hyperlane reconfiguration (ISM, remote tokens, routes)Vault admin Safe and remote owner Safes0 sRoutine registrations
Hyperlane inbound pauseHyperlane's PausableIsm owner0 sNever used
Stuck-message reconciliationVault owner Safe48 hMoves locked sUSN to the owner; not observed

The vault upgrade approved on 10 June 2026, which had sat past its ETA, was cancelled on 12 October (tx 0x9c16bcd0d9aa0d68457e5bc15fd157e1e475f2981940e6c07639f4ef5713f07e). No upgrade is pending on any chain's timelock.

On Ethereum, USN is minted by MinterHandlerV2, whose mint is capped at 10M per block and per day (limits that take 4 hours to change) and whose mintAndRebase is capped at 25,000 USN per call with no aggregate limit. A codeless key has held the MINTER role since 16 September. On the remote chains, sUSN is minted only by bridge messages from registered remotes, now bounded at 4M per origin per 8 hours.

Audit & code integrity

Audit firmDate(s)ScopeFindingsDeployed-code match
HashlockJun 2025, Nov 2025, Mar 2026, Sep 2026Sep 2026: bridge rate limiter and the USN, vault and remote builds executed on 1 OctSep 2026: 0 High, 1 Medium acknowledged (possible double payout on stuck-message reconciliation)Fix-review commit 81ef548c equals the live Ethereum vault and USN and the Base, HyperEVM, Berachain and Citrea implementations
Sherlock (collaborative)16–26 Jun 2026; report 21 Jul 2026MinterHandlerV2, periphery and timelock, RedeemHandlerV2, remote sUSN, vault and USN Hyperlane builds0 Critical / 0 High / 6 Medium / 8 Low (2 Medium resolved, 4 acknowledged)Audited fcf78793, final 45ee4e19; MinterHandlerV2 diverges from the final commit
MoveBitJun 2026Sui onlyNot captured—
HalbornDec 2024; Mar 2025Staking vaultNot captured—
QuantstampSep 2024Not capturedNot captured—

The bug bounty is described in Noon's docs as an "active bug bounty" reached by email; no platform, tiers or payouts are published.

Deployed code outside audited scope or diverging:

The fund-holding Ethereum proxies changed on 1 October 2026 and equal the Hashlock September 2026 fix-review commit, so they are covered by the latest audit. The full cross-check is in the appendix.

Risks & caveats

Appendix

Further risks, ranked 11–19

#RiskMechanismSeverity
11Off-chain take and unbounded rail leversTake set via rebase size with no on-chain maximum; redemption-rail setters unbounded, behind only a 4-hour timelock; two codeless keys among the rebase managersMedium
12Starknet censorship / no forced inclusion5.663% of float on an L2 without a user escape hatchMedium
13Operator wallet custody and address poisoningThe operator wallet runs the basis and T-bill legs; manual top-ups under a lookalike campaign that now also targets the Operations Fund walletMedium
14Sustained sUSN discount to NAVPool price −0.60% vs NAV for 6.6 days with no arbitrageMedium
15Instant exit re-point or freeze by the SafesetWithdrawalHandler (no event), pause, USN blacklist of the escrowMedium
16Single-source Stork integrator oracleInstant Stork Safe upgrades, one signing key, no fallback; nanosecond timestamps defeat staleness checksMedium
17Limiter durabilityBuckets settable to 0 (unlimited) after a 4-hour timelock; Hyperlane configuration remains instantLow
18Chain halts on minority legsBase, Starknet, Sui and Berachain have had multi-hour haltsLow
19Thin peg bandNo bid below 0.98995 once the cluster's liquidity band is exhaustedLow

Deployed code vs audit — all contracts

Latest audit on record: Hashlock "Bridge rate limiter v1" (September 2026, fix-review commit 81ef548c).

ContractCurrent implementationLast upgrade (UTC)Latest auditCoverage
Ethereum sUSN vault 0xE24a3DC889621612422A64E6388927901608B91D0xeF2eA4250B7CE4D0aA9Ca70607ECeF278C6EAB152026-10-01 17:48Hashlock Sep 2026Covered
Ethereum USN 0xdA67B4284609d2d48e5d10cfAc411572727dc1eD0x79FD7FE2a8EbcAE47798321b2AC97107dF3de2292026-10-01 17:48Hashlock Sep 2026Covered
RedeemHandlerV2 0xAb0c423975B446e785E21B9b10F3B421c8ED9197Non-proxy (created 2026-09-17)—Sherlock Jul 2026Covered (trivial diff)
Upgrade Timelock 0xE5e412C212B4FBbF550A94e7BD5e83dB0B315A7FNon-proxy—Sherlock Jul 2026Covered (import paths only)
Bridge rate limiter 0xe8c94FA4FEdFa21B1d0D0Dd78E41bCE9d99d959F and EVM-remote twinsNon-upgradeable—Hashlock Sep 2026Covered
MinterHandlerV2 0xB91b361ebE4022Bb62dF0651bDD09b21209ac058Non-proxy—Sherlock Jul 2026Not covered (pre-remediation build)
WithdrawalHandler 0x0DaBc0D9B270c9B0C4C77AaCeAa712b56D0F9178Non-proxy—Sherlock Jul 2026Not covered (outside scope list)
Legacy redeemer 0xF5DEAfcdFbC21Cb1E558906d00A1Fdb4b56173e8Non-proxy——Unknown
Base sUSN 0x34a2798D47b238A7CbA9D87D49618DEE6C4D999F0xa02Ca8C6130B75b320FAa785034E95D4374A89422026-10-01Hashlock Sep 2026Covered
HyperEVM sUSN 0x34a2798D47b238A7CbA9D87D49618DEE6C4D999F0xffC95e7E447DC94DcE706B8afda751349E6762272026-10-01Hashlock Sep 2026Covered
Berachain sUSN 0xdA67B4284609d2d48e5d10cfAc411572727dc1eD0x657284c8337ab91b1a7d4eb66Be97596f48781172026-10-01Hashlock Sep 2026Covered
Citrea sUSN 0xdA67B4284609d2d48e5d10cfAc411572727dc1eD0x6D1019bdbe1Da163134Aba821bBfc1cCAEb988a82026-10-01Hashlock Sep 2026Covered
zkSync Era sUSN 0xB6a09d426861c63722Aa0b333a9cE5d5a9B04c4f0x8B9E886B6850615911c61a7cd10c9C6630d1A03dAfter 2025-07-09Hashlock Sep 2026 / Sherlock Jul 2026Not covered (OFT variant)
zkSync Era USN 0x0469d9d1dE0ee58fA1153ef00836B9BbCb84c0B60xb00B492099323E386dFD1E014850Ca16396E8C22After 2025-07-24Hashlock Sep 2026 / Sherlock Jul 2026Not covered (OFT variant)
Sophon sUSN 0xb87DbE27Db932baCAAA96478443b6519D52C50040xF280F30e0dBde661CE8E38ACD658Fc40F755EF802025-07-09—Unknown
Sophon USN 0xC1AA99c3881B26901aF70738A7C217dc32536d360xF90d5784E175b6142958Ec32B77B7aa63582d9572025-07-12—Unknown
Sophon USN, second deployment 0x0469d9d1dE0ee58fA1153ef00836B9BbCb84c0B60xc3068D1deAEd95bf821DE67f560A353600e8A07a (unverified)2024-12-09—Unknown
TAC sUSN 0x5Ced7F73B76A555CCB372cc0F0137bEc5665F81E0x6D1019bdbe1Da163134Aba821bBfc1cCAEb988a8 (not diffed)Not captured—Unknown
Stork oracle, Base 0x647DFd812BC1e116c6992CB2bC353b2112176fD60x90e093B850d4eeA5bcd29E6657589E45f78eF53B2026-05-07Third partyUnknown
Stork oracle, Arbitrum / Citrea / HyperEVM 0xacC0a0cF13571d30B4b8637996F5D6D774d4fd620x376AdC2c…, 0xF89CEf90…, 0x6e498b02…2026-05-07 / 2026-06-12 / 2026-05-07Third partyUnknown

Contract inventory — Ethereum

ContractAddressUpgrade authorityDelayAudit coverage
USN (proxy)0xdA67B4284609d2d48e5d10cfAc411572727dc1eDProxyAdmin 0x55f39512cb43111A13E8440ee3e3602e72628239 → Upgrade Timelock → owner Safe48 hCovered
sUSN ERC-4626 vault (proxy)0xE24a3DC889621612422A64E6388927901608B91DProxyAdmin 0x1908284b50EE152C9f00c8E65a81fc1C4520BD81 → Upgrade Timelock → owner Safe48 hCovered
MinterHandlerV20xB91b361ebE4022Bb62dF0651bDD09b21209ac058Non-upgradeable; admin 4h Timelock (since 12 Oct)4 hNot covered
RedeemHandlerV20xAb0c423975B446e785E21B9b10F3B421c8ED9197Non-upgradeable; admin 4h Timelock (since 12 Oct); approver and treasury 0xFeD8617Fb46461E5CeBe4976Bf0ebD87689Ef14E (codeless)4 hCovered
Legacy redeemer0xF5DEAfcdFbC21Cb1E558906d00A1Fdb4b56173e8Non-upgradeable—Unknown
WithdrawalHandler (7-day escrow)0x0DaBc0D9B270c9B0C4C77AaCeAa712b56D0F9178Non-upgradeable; admin Generic Timelock—Not covered (outside scope list)
Bridge rate limiter0xe8c94FA4FEdFa21B1d0D0Dd78E41bCE9d99d959FNon-upgradeable; setRateLimits behind the 4h Timelock4 hCovered
Upgrade Timelock0xE5e412C212B4FBbF550A94e7BD5e83dB0B315A7FOwner Safe48 hCovered
4h Timelock (rate limits, LayerZero delegate, redemption and minter admin)0x398dCDdae394198E6f81d6d8f827CF93b60fB5AEOwner Safe4 hUnknown
Generic Timelock (WithdrawalHandler admin)0x36857EF0B10A61A68d58C29eE256990fa9699722Owner Safe48 hUnknown
Owner Safe (3-of-6)0x1ea169EcCcf7714E7ba04900e1a3357cCA77327fSelfnone—
Collateral Safe (pass-through, now empty)0x365bd6fb4200e422a2b1f7b9Dfb1C00471E6D089Selfnone—
Operator wallet (minter custodial wallet, Hyperliquid account)0x4fD04553468610e5a88a2cffA38E057C954312DaNo code (MPC claimed first-party)——
Insurance Fund Safe0x646Db2928d04a947d485fD8267b236B817d89daASelfnone—
USN fixed-rate oracle0xBd154793659D1E6ea0C58754cEd6807059A421b0Immutable—Unknown
sUSN rate-provider oracle0x7f741401422Afff770360fD13127F7462C6E1A79Immutable—Unknown
Morpho oracles, sUSN/USDC and sUSN/USDT0xC415Cc3F04F9074A9562aEEe02591e65D39A94aa, 0x3B26BEE26e7eA5225b459abB7433eAb4ea52ed01Immutable—Unknown
Stork-Chainlink adapter (USN/USD capped)0x6E46353f6ba66e22289aAE9ffa79E1BFD593219eImmutable (third party)—Unknown
USN/USD Stork rate provider0x78FC48b3bb59d8a1F29d4ff8c78Bba64E9374F97Third party—Unknown
PT oracles (Chainlink infrequent, Spectra)0xc0D62E2470A585C8a638B123A78ff31b593af8Ae, 0x76d048e47E1d77940416B656D8D7FEd34931a393Immutable; Spectra oracle owned by the deployer key—Unknown

Addresses that earlier inventories listed under Ethereum but that hold no code there (other chains' Safes, timelocks and token deployments) are shown under their own chains below.

Contract inventory — Base

ContractAddressUpgrade authorityDelayAudit coverage
sUSN (proxy)0x34a2798D47b238A7CbA9D87D49618DEE6C4D999FProxyAdmin 0xdDC0416e9bB96Dd1408CbAb19b48bd7d7B1498A7 → Timelock 0xA9BB96bb79492Aa64199f078362ECd069D565e85 → Safe48 hCovered
Owner Safe (3-of-5)0xf56d33ef52642ce226A566610A979DC8d954592DSelfnone—
Stork oracle (proxy)0x647DFd812BC1e116c6992CB2bC353b2112176fD6Stork Safe 0xA994817A177cBBd345890f059D6F60E10381b4De (3-of-6)noneUnknown (third party)
Stork-Chainlink adapters (USN/USD, sUSN/USN)0x0e658Ea83d19e540a5b4cf6BC2A6093a55525561, 0x907fb22C2DA56642F89702b0970a03ed13EbF136Immutable—Unknown (third party)

Contract inventory — HyperEVM

ContractAddressUpgrade authorityDelayAudit coverage
sUSN (proxy)0x34a2798D47b238A7CbA9D87D49618DEE6C4D999FProxyAdmin 0xdDC0416e9bB96Dd1408CbAb19b48bd7d7B1498A7 → Timelock 0x73D59063212c1A3fD32882d46A84EFb37911550d → Safe 0x3D6B578afDfdcd9e74EB0CdbDdCf2435502FC5b8 (3-of-5)24 hCovered
Stork oracle (proxy)0xacC0a0cF13571d30B4b8637996F5D6D774d4fd62Stork Safe 0x904E43857922C08033f47AF3Cf09074FBbf8Bf69 (3-of-6)noneUnknown (third party)
Stork-Chainlink adapters0x9A137Fdbe8BbB6065626098818dC82D26c20659b, 0xf08C4a8f113c8a90788F02b8151085eb9bC01E0eImmutable—Unknown (third party)

Contract inventory — Berachain

ContractAddressUpgrade authorityDelayAudit coverage
sUSN (proxy)0xdA67B4284609d2d48e5d10cfAc411572727dc1eDProxyAdmin 0x55f39512cb43111A13E8440ee3e3602e72628239 → Timelock 0xea84aC70f00f47ad6FBE51233AAE25799B9f0A02 → Safe 0x94E9f383b085D32973634EA7c9bB2038eF9a3C58 (3-of-5)48 hCovered

The Berachain Hyperlane Mailbox is unverified on Berascan and Sourcify.

Contract inventory — Citrea

ContractAddressUpgrade authorityDelayAudit coverage
sUSN (proxy)0xdA67B4284609d2d48e5d10cfAc411572727dc1eDProxyAdmin 0x55f39512cb43111A13E8440ee3e3602e72628239 → Timelock 0xf6f40baAFBCbB29855F4D9A29576B812E0B33fac → Safe 0xB2aD758Ee2710527A28d906F9588938c2e5cFc80 (3-of-5, all signers codeless)48 hCovered
Stork oracle (proxy)0xacC0a0cF13571d30B4b8637996F5D6D774d4fd62Stork Safe 0xDCC60a128A62D65c35DcB095C751cC26fBF8895A (3-of-6)noneUnknown (third party)
Stork-Chainlink adapters0x9A137Fdbe8BbB6065626098818dC82D26c20659b, 0xf08C4a8f113c8a90788F02b8151085eb9bC01E0eImmutable; no staleness or deviation guard—Unknown (third party)

Contract inventory — zkSync Era

ContractAddressUpgrade authorityDelayAudit coverage
sUSN (proxy)0xB6a09d426861c63722Aa0b333a9cE5d5a9B04c4fProxyAdmin 0x5130C9cd9e85B4a95F9b44c7Eb8667106e8fdecc → Timelock 0x6E7FD7751649993a8C01837Ab7f035d21E6f2Ace → Safe 0x15d91EB2c3188BB85881D2E09b5025F3Fcc4a263 (3-of-4)48 hNot covered (OFT variant)
USN (proxy)0x0469d9d1dE0ee58fA1153ef00836B9BbCb84c0B6ProxyAdmin 0x5a82384A042cCe41f9aC6F0C110773E5B3266F11 → Timelock 0x6E7FD7751649993a8C01837Ab7f035d21E6f2Ace → Safe 0x15d91EB2c3188BB85881D2E09b5025F3Fcc4a263 (3-of-4)48 hNot covered (OFT variant)

Contract inventory — Sophon and TAC

ContractAddressUpgrade authorityDelayAudit coverage
Sophon sUSN (proxy)0xb87DbE27Db932baCAAA96478443b6519D52C5004ProxyAdmin 0x90D0307D14009B9081CAb5a3eE92C62625649D5f → deployer key 0x173806021b18c4E60170e412DC88F991eB00D699noneUnknown
Sophon USN (proxy)0xC1AA99c3881B26901aF70738A7C217dc32536d36ProxyAdmin 0xaD871a241D1fE8Dd6293d6746D1898d211cF5890 → Safe 0x553d36879016Ce22977a622804EeE76Dc0dC88e0 (3-of-4)noneUnknown
Sophon USN, second deployment (zero supply, no peers)0x0469d9d1dE0ee58fA1153ef00836B9BbCb84c0B6ProxyAdmin 0x5a82384A042cCe41f9aC6F0C110773E5B3266F11 → deployer key; implementation unverifiednoneUnknown
Sophon unverified contract (zero supply, no peers)0xB6a09d426861c63722Aa0b333a9cE5d5a9B04c4fUnresolved (no proxy slots, no owner)UnresolvedUnknown
TAC sUSN (proxy)0x5Ced7F73B76A555CCB372cc0F0137bEc5665F81EProxyAdmin 0x36849808656f85ecEb5Fb6AEbd8e4c1532B6cFc7 → deployer key; bridge configuration under Safe 0x868Dd9BCe1d60362f2169E7b91E6aA2f71F64750 (3-of-6)noneUnknown

TAC and Sophon are deprecated and unlinked at every end. On Ethereum, Base and HyperEVM their routes point to the dead address with limits of 1 wei, Ethereum and zkSync no longer peer Sophon, both were unenrolled from Starknet on 2 October, and Berachain and Citrea were never connected, so neither chain can draw on the Ethereum lockbox.

Starknet, Sui and discovery-only chains